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Abstract
Predicting the outcomes of cyber-physical systems with multiple human interactions is a
challenging problem. This article reviews a game theoretical approach to address this issue,
where reinforcement learning is employed to predict the time-extended interaction dynamics.
We explain that the most attractive feature of the method is proposing a computationally
feasible approach to simultaneously model multiple humans as decision makers, instead of
determining the decision dynamics of the intelligent agent of interest and forcing the others
to obey certain kinematic and dynamic constraints imposed by the environment. We present
two recent exploitations of the method to model 1) unmanned aircraft integration into the
National Airspace System and 2) highway traffic. We conclude the article by providing
ongoing and future work about employing, improving and validating the method. We also
provide related open problems and research opportunities.
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1. Introduction
In a 2006 NASA report, allocation of tasks, as well as switching, between humans and
automation is stated as one of the highest priority research needs for a successful next gen-
eration airspace development, where several new automation components are expected to be
introduced to cope with the inevitable increase in traffic density (Sheridan et al., 2006). A
2012 U.S. Department of Defense report (Murphy and Shields, 2012) declares that the tax-
onomy established by the “levels of autonomy” creates “a focus on machines, rather than on
the human-machine system,” which in turn “has led to designs that provide specific functions
rather than overall resilient capability”. The same report suggests that human-system col-
laboration should be the defining theme for the design and operation of autonomous systems.
In a 2017 review article (Lamnabhi-Lagarrigue et al., 2017), where an in-depth analysis is
provided about the current and future roles of the systems and control field, the question
“how to optimally conjugate automated systems with the interplay of humans?” is posed as
one of the grand challenges. It is therefore clearly understood by engineers and scientists
that considering humans as integral parts of complex physical systems that embody commu-
nication, computation, control and networking technologies, can potentially accelerate the
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advancement of technology that can address pressing human needs. This requires a new
perspective that considers the human, the physical plant and enabling cyber-technologies as
a single system, namely a cyber-physical and human system (CPHS). This is in contrast to
imagining the human solely as a user who is isolated from the technology.
Adopting the CPHS framework brings its own challenges, especially when it comes to
obtaining predictive models. Apart from the intricacies of cyber-physical system (CPS)
modeling, the human element is usually the most demanding component of a CPHS in terms
of forecasting the future behavior. The difficulty intensifies when the system contains more
than one human, which requires factoring in multiple human-human and human-automation
interactions. The focus of this paper is on the latter type, where human interactions are
an inseparable feature of the system. To simplify the exposition in this paper, we use
“human-machine interactions”, “human-autonomy interactions” and “human interactions”
interchangeably, although a more careful use of the language that pays attention to nuances is
possible. To obtain realistic models of CPHS, therefore, we need to concentrate on modeling
methods that give us the ability to include typical human characteristics. For example,
human interactions are generally not deterministic in nature, which can be captured in
CPHS models by utilizing a probabilistic modeling framework. Furthermore, before taking
an action, a human generally contemplates other intelligent agents’ (such as other humans or
automation) possible actions and then tries to choose a move that will increase the chances of
obtaining the best outcome reflecting his or her preferences. A representational CPHS model
needs to incorporate this “strategic behavior” (Camerer, 2011) of humans. Finally, as much
as we want to believe otherwise, humans do not always, if at all, act in an optimal fashion.
Our cognitive capabilities and computational powers are not always ample enough to provide
the best response to a given situation. This final point is important for distinguishing CPHS
models from autonomy models, where, based on available information, an algorithm can
possibly be designed to react in the most appropriate way. Models that comprise these three
attributes of human reactions, namely, being probabilistic, strategic and non-optimal, have
a higher chance of success in terms of representing real-life behavior, for the cases where
multiple humans are involved.
A solution for CPHS modeling that addresses human interactions is proposed by the
introduction of the “Semi Network-Form Games” (SNFG) formalism (Lee and Wolpert,
2011; Lee et al., 2013). SNFG merges three modeling tools: Bayesian networks, game theory
(GT) and reinforcement learning (RL). While the Bayesian networks form the probabilistic
foundation of the method, game theory provides the required mechanism to produce strategic
behavior expected from human interactions, and reinforcement learning enables obtaining
time-extended scenarios where humans take successive actions. Non-optimal behavior, which
is thought to be a typical human trait, emerges naturally in SNFG with the type of the
exploited game theoretical solution technique and reinforcement learning.
The first research result that exploits the SNFG idea of merging GT and RL to create a
CPHS modeling framework for a realistic engineering system, including more than 2 humans,
has appeared in Musavi et al. (2016), where the problem of integrating unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) into the national airspace (NAS) is carefully studied. The results reported in
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Musavi et al. (2016) are supported by extensive simulation capabilities, where the interactions
of 180 manned aircraft pilots are modeled. This study builds upon earlier initial attempts to
model smaller airspace scenarios with human interactions (Yildiz et al., 2012, 2013, 2014).
Simultaneous modeling of a large number of decision making agents (pilots, in this case) in
a complex scenario is difficult due to the computational cost. A common approach in the
literature is to model a single decision maker, whose actions are of interest, and force the rest
to obey certain kinematic and dynamic constraints, to obtain a reasonable model behavior.
However, although this approach presents some insight into the dynamics of the system, it is
limiting due to grossly simplifying the real-life human interactions. The study conducted by
Musavi et al. (2016) provided, for the first time in the literature, probabilistic outcomes of
UAS integration scenarios, where each of the 180 aircraft pilots are modeled using the game
theoretical decision making process, simultaneously. In this research, Bayesian Networks are
not utilized and the probabilistic decision making is obtained through employing a stochastic
reinforcement learning algorithm proposed in Jaakkola et al. (1994). Recently, this work is
extended for the cases where the aircraft can move both horizontally and vertically in a
3-dimensional airspace (Musavi et al., 2018). This extension required a dramatically larger
observation space for the pilots which ruled out the possibility of using exact RL methods.
To address this issue, Neural-Fitted Q-iteration (Riedmiller, 2005; Riedmiller et al., 2007;
Gabel et al., 2011) is integrated into the game theoretical framework, which uses neural
networks (NN) for compactly estimating the exact state-action values needed by the RL
algorithm.
Another study, exploiting the same approach, conducted by Li et al. (2018) achieved a
similar result in the automotive domain, by creating a modeling framework for road traffic
consisting of 50 manned vehicles and an autonomous car. This result was a continuation
of leading studies conducted by Oyler et al. (2016) and Li et al. (2016). Similar to Musavi
et al. (2016) and Musavi et al. (2018), this contribution is also the first in the automotive
literature where a large number of decision making drivers are simultaneously modeled using
a game theoretical modeling approach. Recently, an extended version of this work, which
covers a larger class of interaction scenarios, with the help of a road traffic simulation on a
5-lane highway, is presented in Albaba et al. (2019), where validation studies by processing
real traffic data, which is provided in Colyar and Halkias (2007), is conducted.
In this paper, we first present the basic components of the modeling approach discussed
above and then provide the examples of CPHS framework creation, using GT and RL,
for engineering systems that can be employed in predicting the outcomes of having several
humans, automation and physical systems interact with each other in extended periods
of time. These ideas exist in the literature in a fragmented manner, and by elucidating
them in an aggregated form here, we provide a concise single source. The deliberations
in this article on employing game theory and reinforcement learning for building CPHS
modeling frameworks should benefit control practitioners whose goal is to obtain models
of engineering systems where humans are active players. Finally, we discuss ongoing and
future work about the topic, together with open problems that may provide several different
research opportunities for the CPHS community.
3
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we review the existing work. In
Section 3, we explain the basic building blocks of the game theoretical model. In Section 4,
we show how these blocks are combined together to form the overall modeling approach. In
Sections 5 and 6, we present the exploitation of the approach to create models of two different
engineering systems containing multiple human interactions. We provide a computational
complexity analysis in Section 7. In Section 8 and 9 we discuss ongoing and future work, and
related open problems, respectively. Finally, we provide a summary of the article in Section
10.
2. Review of existing work
In this section, we review research activities looking for the answer to this question:
“How can we predict the outcomes of engineering scenarios involving a cyber-physical human
system with not one but several human elements?”. The literature revolving around this
salient question, either partially or completely, covers a wide range of engineering realms,
which is hard to exhaustively examine in the limits of this article. Since, up until now,
there has been two main studies addressing this question by exploiting the game theoretical
modeling approach elaborated in this paper, we will focus on areas that are in the scope of
these two research efforts: Unmanned aircraft system integration into the national airspace
and road transportation.
2.1. Unmanned aircraft systems integration into the national airspace
Although unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) has been attracting increasingly more at-
tention, we have not yet witnessed the maturation of the civil markets. One of the main
reasons for this underutilized potential can be attributed to the lack of regular access to the
National Airspace System (NAS) (Dalamagkidis et al., 2008). Due to the well-justified risk-
averse nature of the aviation industry, advances in developing rules and procedures for UAS
integration into NAS are progressing relatively slowly, which results in UAS flying mainly in
restricted airspace. Until it is clearly assured that UAS will not pose a danger to the existing
air traffic and thus their integration is proven to be safe, routine access to NAS will not be
realized (FAA, 2013; European RPAS Steering Group, 2013). There are many studies that
address the problem of UAS integration into the airspace in terms of providing methods and
tools to ensure safety. Ding et al. (2016) proposes an autonomous decision making system
for UAVs for determining a safe landing site in the case of an anomaly. For UAV platoons,
controller design frameworks are presented in Chen et al. (2015, 2016, 2017b), where col-
lisions are eliminated and target states are reached. In Chen et al. (2017a), collision-free
trajectories are designed for large-scale multi-UAV systems in the presence of disturbances
in vehicle dynamics, and the method is demonstrated using up to 200 UAVs, in simulation
environment.
UAS integration still remains to be a challenge (Melnyk, 2019) and since we don’t have
the necessary experience to evaluate the effects of integration and there is not enough data
yet, the only way to predict the outcomes of adding UAS into the airspace is conducting
careful simulations (DeGarmo, 2004). To obtain reliable simulation results, a high-fidelity
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model of the airspace in the presence of manned and unmanned aircraft together with their
interactions need to be obtained.
A typical approach in the airspace traffic modeling literature includes the assumption of
pilots always following an ideal behavior pattern without any deviations. This is an unreal-
istic assumption since, as discussed earlier, a representative model should allow probabilistic
human behavior. For example, it is well-documented that pilots may ignore controller’s
commands or do not obey traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisories
during emergency situations (Pritchett, 2010). In addition, it is reported that only 13% of
pilot reactions agreed with the pilot model, which predicts a deterministic behavior, used
for establishing TCAS algorithms (Kuchar and Drumm, 2007; Lee and Wolpert, 2011).
One of the main issues that needs to be solved for a safe integration is the development
of a dependable sense-and-avoid (SAA) technology for the unmanned aircraft systems. It is
not possible to mature this technology without testing its performance through simulations
with reliable pilot models (Maki et al., 2012). There exist several SAA methods introduced
in the literature, with validations conducted via simulations and experiments. Kuchar et al.
(2004) carefully analyzed the utilization of TCAS as the SAA logic, and performed simulation
tests using the aircraft encounter model developed by Kochenderfer et al. (2008). During
the tests, pilot reactions were assumed to be known beforehand, based on the respective
motions of the conflicting aircraft. In another study, Perez-Batlle et al. (2012) suggested
maneuvers to solve UAS separation conflicts and tested these suggestions with simulations
that contain pilots following the recommended maneuvers without any error. The perfor-
mance of the SAA algorithm proposed in Florent et al. (2010) was assessed by simulations
and experiments. For these assessments, the manned aircraft in separation conflict with the
UAS were assumed to continue their motion unaffected, while the UAS were implementing
the proposed SAA technique. Another example where predefined pilot action models are
employed for evaluating various SAA algorithms can be found in Billingsley (2006).
The modeling framework for UAS integration into NAS that is discussed in this article
differentiates itself from the above mentioned environments by providing a platform where
pilot actions are not pre-determined but obtained through a decision making process by
satisfying a utility function, or a “happiness function”, that reflects pilot preferences. Fur-
thermore, with the proposed approach, several pilot-pilot and pilot-UAS interactions (180 of
them) can be modeled in time-extended scenarios, in a probabilistic manner, with the help
of the convergence of game theory and reinforcement learning. The details of this framework
are provided in Section 5.
2.2. Road transportation
We have reliable physical models of road vehicles that have high predictive power. How-
ever, the modeling problem quickly becomes difficult to handle when the task is modeling
the vehicle together with the driver operating it. Furthermore, if the desired outcome is a
model for traffic containing several vehicles, both manned and unmanned, obtaining answers
turns out to be a real challenge. The main obstacle in this matter in question is the lack of
accurate human interaction models.
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Valid human interaction models in road traffic may prove themselves useful for two main
tasks: Creating accurate traffic simulators that can be used for initial testing and tuning of
autonomous car control algorithms, and designing autonomous vehicle control systems based
on human way of driving, which can improve the passengers’ comfort by making them feel
as if a human driver is in control (Carvalho et al., 2015).
There are several successful driver modeling studies in the literature. Real traffic data
is employed to obtain Hidden Markov Model based driver models in Lefevre et al. (2014)
and Lefevre et al. (2015). A semiautonomous vehicle control architecture is proposed in
Vasudevan et al. (2012) and Shia et al. (2014), where the driver model is obtained, through
k-means clustering, and used to inform the controller that produces corrections for driver
inputs. Logical, if-then-else commands form the driver decisions in a modeling framework
created by Salvucci et al. (2001). A multi-agent simulator is employed to model lane changing
in Hidas (2002). Lane changing behavior is modeled also in Kumar et al. (2013), where
Bayesian filters and support vector machines are utilized to predict driver intent. There is
another body of work on modeling drivers as controllers in a closed loop control system,
examples of which can be found in Hess and Modjtahedzadeh (1990); Sharp et al. (2000);
Treiber et al. (2000); Salvucci and Gray (2004) and Ungoren and Peng (2005). A more recent
example of feedback controller type driver modeling can be seen in Wakitani et al. (2018).
The proposed modeling framework for road traffic in this article has the following dis-
tinctions compared to earlier work: 1) The driver interaction models are scalable and a
traffic scenario consisting of several vehicles interacting with each other can be modeled
using a game theoretical approach; 2) driver behavior is obtained through employing a de-
cision making process, instead of assuming a preset driver action model that is a function
of time or states; 3) driver models are simultaneously strategic, meaning that they consider
other intelligent agents (drivers, unmanned vehicles) possible actions and produce a response
accordingly, based on a utility function representing their priorities. This is in contrast to
modeling a single driver as a decision maker while assigning pre-determined trajectory pro-
files for the others. All the listed advantages are realized through the game theoretical
modeling approach discussed in this article. There are other game theoretical driving mod-
eling approaches reported in the literature such as the ones proposed by Yoo and Langari
(2012) and Yoo and Langari (2013), where driver interactions are successfully modeled. On
the other hand, unlike the method discussed in this article, these studies do not consider a
time-extended scenario. Dextreit and Kolmanovsky (2014) also consider a game theoretical
approach to model the interactions between the driver and the ego vehicle’s power train. By
penalizing the vehicle-driver system features of fuel consumption, emissions, battery state
and operating conditions, this approach is demonstrated, via experiments, to perform better
than the baseline controller, in terms of these system features, while still providing good
drivability. However, the utilized game theoretical approach, namely Stackelberg solution,
quickly becomes computationally intractable as the number of intelligent agents in the game
increases, unlike the hierarchical game theoretical approach used in the method proposed in
this article. The details of the proposed method are provided in Section 6.
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3. The basics
In this section, we present the fundamental building blocks of the game theoretical mod-
eling framework discussed in this article. These blocks are game theory and reinforcement
learning. Below, we explain these pieces with a relatively narrow scope, using a semi-formal
language to allow easy access, and with enough details that will enable understanding of
the basic ideas necessary to grasp the following sections. There are several sources in the
literature that can be used for formal introductions to these topics, such as Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) and Camerer (2011) for game theory, and Wiering and van Otterlo (2012) and
Sutton and Barto (2018) for reinforcement learning.
3.1. Game theory
Game theory studies the interactions between strategic agents. A strategic agent is one
that considers other agents’ possible actions and their effects on the game while making his
or her own decisions. The theory makes predictions about the outcomes of these interactions
using precise mathematics.
Players in a game theoretical setting refer to the entities who can effect the game by
their moves (or actions, or decisions). Strategy of a player defines the procedure based on
which a player chooses his or her actions. A solution concept is a well established set of rules
that are used to predict how a game will unfold. A Nash equilibrium is a solution concept,
defined similarly to the equilibrium in system dynamics: When players have no incentive to
deviate from their selected actions, the game is said to be in Nash equilibrium. This means
that in Nash equilibrium, players choose their best actions against each others’ actions. A
typical example where Nash equilibrium can be observed is a game called the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. In this game, there are two prisoners, Prisoner A and Prisoner B. They are put
in separate rooms so that they can not communicate. Both of them are provided with the
following information: If Prisoner A confesses the crime, he will be released provided that
Prisoner B denies the crime, which will cause Prisoner B serve 10 years in prison. Similarly,
if Prisoner B confesses, he will be released provided that Prisoner A denies the crime, which
will put Prisoner A in prison for 10 years. If they both deny, each will serve 3 years. If they
both confess, each will serve 5 years in prison. We can represent this game in matrix form as
shown in Figure 1, where players’ payoffs amount to the negative of the years to be served in
prison. It is seen that, although resulting in a low overall payoff, (Confess, Confess) choice is
the only Nash equilibrium since no player wants to change their move once they are in this
state. It is important to note that Nash equilibrium is not always unique and there may be
more than one Nash equilibrium depending on the game.
There are other equilibrium concepts such as quantal response equilibrium where instead
of giving the best response to other players’ actions, the players choose a probability dis-
tribution over their action space where actions with higher expected payoffs have higher
probability of being played.
Not all solution concepts predict an equilibrium. For example, level-k thinking is a non-
equilibrium game theoretical model of strategic interactions, which assigns different levels of
reasoning for players (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2009). In this model, the
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Confess Deny
Confess -5, -5 0, -10
Deny -10, 0 -3, -3
Prisoner B
Prisoner A
Figure 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
lowest level of reasoning is level-0, which represents non-strategic thinking, simply meaning
that the players who reason at this level have a strategy that does not take into account other
players’ possible actions. A level-1 player, on the other hand, takes the best action assuming
that his or her opponents are level-0 players. Similarly, a level-k player responds best to his
belief that the other players are reasoning at level-(k-1). Therefore, this model assumes an
iterated best response (Crawford, 2008). Experimental results presented in Camerer (2011)
corroborate the predictions of this solution concept with varying success.
An elementary example for the level-k reasoning model can be given considering two
people, named Diana and Ritchie, walking towards each other, along a collision path, in
a university corridor. If Ritchie decides to continue walking without considering Diana’s
possible actions, Ritchie can be considered as a level-0, non-strategic thinker. On the other
hand, if Diana believes that Ritchie is a level-0 thinker and therefore decides that the best
action is stepping right, then Diana can be modeled as a level-1 player. Although there exists
experimental evidence for level-k predictions, this simple example presents a difficulty in this
approach: The players’ beliefs of others may be wrong. Another issue is that even if the
players correctly estimate their opponents’ levels, the behavior patterns coded by different
levels are sensitive to the selection of the level-0 algorithm. That’s why level-0 is often
referred as the anchoring level. Although these “problems” are real, they may actually be
considered as the strengths of this method when it comes to modeling humans. As discussed
in the Introduction section, in CPHS with multiple humans, to obtain reasonable predictions,
we need models that do not foresee optimal behavior all the time. Another perspective is that
level-k thinking represents the interactions between intelligent agents that do not have a long
interaction history, therefore it is actually expected that their initial assumptions about each
others’ strategies may not fully reflect reality. This also helps obtain non-optimal human
reactions that are providing best responses to their beliefs about the outside world.
3.2. Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) can be defined as a mathematical representation of learning
through reward and punishment. To clarify this definition, and to be able explain the RL
algorithm used in the CPHS modeling framework discussed in this paper, we first need to
identify main elements of RL and make certain definitions that hold true for almost all RL
methods. In RL, there exists an agent capable of exerting actions that can change the state
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of the environment where the agent operates. The RL problem can be defined as finding
the optimal set of action sequence for an agent to achieve a given goal defined as a function
of the environment states, through interaction with the said environment. For example, the
problem may be making a mobile robot (agent) to go from point A to point B (goal) in a
10 by 10 grid-world with obstacles (environment) by deciding whether to move left, right,
forward or backward (actions), in every step of the way. In this scenario, the state can be
defined as the grid location the robot is occupying.
RL uses the idea of a reward function to describe the preferences of the agent (or the
designer of the agent) while its learning to achieve a predetermined goal. In the mobile robot
example given above, the reward can simply be defined as zero if the robot is at the goal state
of point B, and a fixed negative number, otherwise. A policy is defined as a probabilistic
map from states to actions. The task of the RL algorithm is to find a policy that will make
the agent maximize a cumulative discounted reward, during the time of its operation. One
way to express the cumulative reward is given as
C =
∞∑
t=0
γtrt, (1)
where γ is the discount factor and r is the reward obtained in every step t. There are various
RL techniques proposed to discover action sequences that will attain the goal of maximizing
(1). Almost all of these different methods are based on estimating value functions, which can
be regarded as the value of being in a certain state, based on the policy being implemented.
A value function can be given as
V pi(s) = Epi
{ ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k|st = s
}
(2)
where pi represents the implemented policy and s represents state. A similar function, the
estimation of which also characterizes the RL method, stands for the value of taking a certain
action a, in a given state s. This function is defined as
Qpi(s, a) = Epi
{ ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k|st = s, at = a
}
. (3)
The aim of RL is to find the optimum policy pi∗ that will maximize (optimize) the value
function. The optimal value function is written as V pi
∗
and all its state values are larger than
or equal to that of all other value functions that are created by policies different than the
optimal policy. This can be represented as V pi
∗
(s) ≥ V pi(s), ∀pi,∀s. Similarly, we can write
Qpi
∗
(s, a) ≥ Qpi(s, a),∀pi,∀(s, a), for the optimal action value function. Once the optimal
action value function is found, the policy
pi∗(s) = arg max
a
Qpi
∗
(s, a) (4)
can be used to select the best action in each state. The answer to the question “how to find
the optimal value function” determines the type of RL algorithm. The process of finding the
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optimal policy is sometimes called training. Figure 2 depicts the general training process of
RL. In the figure, the agent observes the states and produces an action based on the observed
states. This action influences the environment and results in a new set of states. These new
states are evaluated by the reward function and a reward signal is formed. The agent uses
this signal to update the policy that is being trained and the next cycle starts with the new
action.
Agent Environmentaction states
Reward 
Function
reward
Figure 2: Reinforcement learning process
In the following subsections, we explain one of the most basic RL algorithms, Q-learning,
and then present two other RL methods that are utilized in the game theoretic modeling
framework elaborated in this article.
Remark 1. The RL algorithms used in this paper are used to obtain human response poli-
cies, which can then be used to quantitatively analyze scenarios where humans are involved, in
the simulation environment. Therefore, there is no physical interaction with the environment
during learning.
3.2.1. Q-learning
One of the RL methods that played a significant role for the success of RL is Q-learning
(Watkins, 1989). In Q-learning, an incremental estimate of the optimal action value function
is realized using the update rule
Qk+1(st, at) = Qk(st, at) + α
(
rt + γmax
a
Qk(st+1, a)−Qk(st, at)
)
, (5)
where α is the step size and γ is the forgetting factor. It is noted that Q-learning is indifferent
to the policy that the agent uses during training to explore the environment, which means
moving from one state to the other . This type of RL algorithms, where exploration and value
function updates (or policy updates) are independent, are called off policy methods. It can be
shown that the learned action value functionQ converges to the optimal action-value function
Q∗ with probability 1, if all state-action pairs (s, a) continue to be visited during training,
and if the number of these visits converges to infinity. Convergence is achieved exactly if
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the step size parameter obeys a variant of the stochastic approximation conditions, given
as Σ∞k=1αk = ∞, Σ∞k=1α2k ≤ ∞. For a constant step size parameter, convergence is achieved
in the mean if 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. It is noted that continuously visiting state-action pairs is a
requirement for any algorithm that is developed for the general case, where a model for the
environment is not provided, to achieve convergence to the optimal solution.(Sutton and
Barto, 1998). The discount factor γ determines how valuable the future rewards are. For
instance, when γ is 0, agent only tries to maximize the immediate rewards. As this value
approaches to 1, the agent becomes more far-sighted.
3.2.2. Neural fitted Q-learning
Instead of keeping a table of Q values, some RL methods use compact structures that
provide approximate Q values. This approach is especially useful when the state space is very
large. Neural Networks (NN) are one of the effective tools used to store the Q-values in a
compact manner, thanks to their universal approximation property. Unlike the conventional
Q-learning method explained above, the state-action values are not stored in a table but
instead, computed as the output of a function constructed by the specific NN structure: If
a state-action pair is fed to the NN as the input, the corresponding approximate Q-value
can be obtained as the NN output. The training of the NN can be achieved by first defining
an error function reflecting the difference between the current and the target Q-values, and
then minimizing this function by back-propagation. Although calculating the Q-values using
a NN provides an effective method, it can fail, either completely or by requiring impractical
convergence times, due to the global representation mechanism (Riedmiller, 2005): During
the training process, NN weights are updated after the introduction of each individual state-
action pair, which also effects the Q-values of other pairs. This may nullify the previous
training gains in other regions. On the other hand, the global representation enables the
generalization power of NNs by assigning similar Q-values to similar state-action pairs, and
thus eliminating the need to train the NN for every possible pair. Therefore, a method is
needed that can both exploit this property and eliminate its detrimental effects.
Neural Fitted Q-learning, proposed by Riedmiller (2005), achieves to both employ the
generalization power of NNs and prevent its potentially harmful effects by storing previous
experiences in the form of 3-tuples, (s, a, s′), in which s is the original state, a is the action
taken and s′ is the reached state, and reusing these experiences whenever an update is
performed after the introduction of a new data point. Calling a collection of these experiences
as set E, the NFQ method is given in Algorithm 1. In the implementation of NFQ learning,
it is advised that instead of a random collection of experiences, greedy search, using available
Q-values, and random exploration are used together.
NFQ contains two types of hyper-parameters: parameter of the Q-learning, the forgetting
factor γ, and the parameters used for NN training. The selection of the Q-learning hyper-
parameter γ is explained in the previous section. For NN training, the resilient propagation
algorithm proposed in Riedmiller and Braun (1993), which works well for batch learning,
is suggested since NFQ is also based on batch learning. It is discussed in Riedmiller and
Braun (1993) that different values of hyperparameters do not effect the performance of the
algorithm dramatically and therefore some predefined values suggested in the paper can be
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Algorithm 1 NFQ Algorithm
1: k = 0
2: Initialize the neural network
3: while k < N do
4: Generate experience set G = {(inputi, targeti), i = 1, 2, ...,#E} where
5: inputi = si, ai, where si is the state and ai is the action of ith experience,
6: targeti = ri + γminaQk(s
′i, a), where ri is the transition cost and γminaQk(s′
i, a)
is the weighted expected maximum path reward for the next state s′i.
7: Calculate the batch error as Σni=1(Q
k(si, ai)−targeti)2, where n refers to the experience
set size.
8: Train the network to minimize the batch error, using resilient back-propagation and
obtain Qk+1 .
9: k+ = 1
10: end while
used for most of the problems. In many NN training software packages (Abadi et al., 2015;
Paszke et al., 2017) these values are already set as default so no further tuning is necessary.
3.2.3. Jaakkola reinforcement learning
An agent being trained by RL uses the available information from the environment. This
information is generally called the “state” of the environment. When the state of the environ-
ment contains all relevant information about the current and the past interaction dynamics
between the agent and the environment, this state is said to have the Markov property (Sut-
ton and Barto, 2018). A learning task involving interactions with an environment that has
Markov property is called a Markov Decision Process (MDP). More specifically, defining the
probability of transitioning from state “s” to state “s′” and obtaining a reward “r”, given
an action “a” as P (s′, r|s, a), if this probability depends only on “s” and “a” but not on
earlier states and actions, this learning task is called an MDP. In almost all RL methods
that have convergence guarantees, the underlying dynamics is assumed to be an MDP. In the
aerospace and automotive application scenarios that are investigated in this paper, although
the underlying dynamics are MDPs, the agents can realistically observe only a portion of the
available states. Therefore, from the agents’ point of view, the tasks are Partially Observable
Markov Decision Processes (POMDP).
Jaakkola reinforcement learning algorithm (Jaakkola et al., 1994) is developed specifically
for systems that can be modeled as POMDPs and therefore is a suitable RL method to be
employed in the learning tasks that are discussed in this work. In Jaakkola algorithm, along
with Q-function, the value function, V , is also used. At the beginning of the Jaakkola
Algorithm, Q values are set to zero for each state-action pair. Moreover, for each state,
probability distribution of actions is set to a uniform distribution. Then, for each iteration
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(s, a, s′), Q and V values are updated according to following equations:
βt(s, a) =
(
1− χt(s, a)
Kt(s, a)
)
γtβt−1(s, a) +
χt(s, a)
Kt(s, a)
βt(s) =
(
1− χt(s)
Kt(a)
)
γtβt−1(s) +
χt(s)
Kt(s)
Qt(s, a) =
(
1− χt(s, a)
Kt(s, a)
)
Qt−1(s, a) + βt(s, a)(Rt −R)
Vt(s) =
(
1− χt(s)
Kt(s)
)
Vt−1(s) + βt(s)(Rt −R)
(6)
where, s is the state, a is the action and t is the time step. Moreover, χt(s, a) (χt(s)) is equal
to 1 if the given state-action pair (state) is visited, and 0 otherwise; Kt(m, a) (Kt(s)) is the
number of times the state-action pair (state) is visited; Rt is the reward in time step t; R
is average reward and γt is the discount factor. After the calculation of Q and V functions,
Jaakkola algorithm updates its trained policy pi(a|s) using the update rule
pi(a|s) = (1− )pi(a|s) + pi1(a|s), (7)
where  is the update rate, and pi1(a|s), the policy that the trained policy is being changed
towards, is a greedy-policy based on the calculated Q(s,a) values. In other words, pi1(a|s)=1
if the action “a” has the highest Q-value in a given state “s”. It can be shown (Jaakkola
et al., 1994) that this policy update always increases the average reward, unless the condition
max
a
[Q(s, a)− V (s)] > 0 (8)
is satisfied. The algorithm increases the average reward until the condition (8) is false, which
constitutes a local maximum.
The Jaakkola algorithm consists of two hyper-parameters: the discount factor γ and
the update rate . For convergence guarantees, γ should initially be selected as a number
between zero and one, and should be scheduled in such a way that it converges to 1 in the
limit. , on the other hand, should satisfy 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
4. Bringing the pieces together: An interplay between game theory and rein-
forcement learning
A schematic of the cyber-physical human system (CPHS) we are interested in, involving
multiple human interactions, is depicted in Figure 3. This is a simplified diagram of the
overall system, showing how humans’ actions change the cyber-physical system states, which
are observed by humans who produce the next set of actions and initiate the next cycle
accordingly. It is noted that humans’ actions are also affecting each other through the closed
loop nature of the information flow. Another important take-away from this figure is that
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human observations are not necessarily the same and an individual human agent does not
have full state information. Observation i blocks, where i = 1, 2, ..., n, represent the human
observation process. This process is limited and imperfect, therefore each human receives
a noisy subset of the whole system state. Human goal blocks represent what each of the
human agent is trying to accomplish, which can be driving from point A to point B in a road
traffic scenario, or protecting his or her own aircraft from a hacker attack in a cyber-security
scenario.
Humans Cyber-Physical 
Systemhuman goal 1
states
Agent n
action 1
action 2
action n
Observation 1
Agent 2
Agent 1 Physical Systems
Automation
Computation
Communication
Networking
human goal 2
Observation 2
human goal n
Observation n
Figure 3: Cyber-physical human system with multiple humans
Obtaining a model for the system shown in Figure 3 requires considering the interaction
of human actions. Humans are strategic thinkers and therefore if we want to build a model
that represents reality, to the best of our ability, we need to find a way to have agent
models that consider other agents’ possible actions before making a move. As discussed in
Section 3.1, this is what game theory is all about: Modeling the interactions between strategic
agents. Therefore, we may utilize game theory to solve this problem. However, there is one
complication in this approach. This is a system where the interaction may last for long
periods of time, and therefore obtaining an equilibrium solution can be computationally
intractable. If the number of agents get larger, as in several real world applications, even for
short periods of interactions, the computational cost grows rapidly. One way around this
problem is using the non-equilibrium game theoretical solution concept, level-k thinking,
explained in Section 3.1, where human actions are predicted in an iterated manner, instead
of being evaluated at the same time. This means that once the anchoring level, level-0,
is selected, a level-1 human agent’s behavior can be identified as the best response to all
the other human actions that are determined by the level-0 policy. Similarly, once level-1
behavior is identified, all the agents in the system are assigned the level-1 policy except the
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one whose level-2 behavior is to be found. Therefore, to predict the policy of a level-k agent,
all the rest of the agents’ policies are set to level-(k-1), which effectively make them a part
of the environment whose dynamics are known, and level-k policy is determined as the best
response to the rest of the level-(k-1) policy actions (see Figure 4). This isolates the level-k
policy as the single policy that needs to be computed. It is noted that in Figure 4, the
actions of the level-(k-1) agents are not shown and the states still belong to the CPS. These
details are omitted for brevity.
Human
Environment
human goal states
action
Observation
Agent 
level-k
Physical Systems
Automation
Computation
Communication
Networking
Agent 
level-(k-1)
Agent 
level-(k-1)
Figure 4: Obtaining level-k policy
Once the difficulty of high computational cost due to multiple decision makers is solved
using level-k thinking, the problem reduces to estimating the optimal action sequence of an
intelligent agent in a given environment. This problem can be stated as a reinforcement
learning (RL) problem by properly defining the states, actions, the environment and the
reward function. (Compare Figure 2 and Figure 4.) Therefore, using one of the suitable RL
methods described in Section 3.2, modeling of the CPHS with multiple human interactions
can be completed. The type of the preferred RL algorithm depends heavily on the observation
and action spaces of the agents, which in turn depend on the engineering domain of the CPHS
operation. The general algorithm used in obtaining the agent policies, demonstrating the
interplay between the game theory and RL, is provided in Algorithm 2, where k is the
maximum desired level. It is noted that, a level-k agent can be made to best-respond to all
lower levels, k=0, 1, .. (k-1), instead of only best-responding to level-(k-1), which may or
may not be desired depending on the application, by including all lower levels in the agent’s
policy space.
In the following sections, based on Musavi et al. (2016) and Albaba et al. (2019), we ex-
plain how this interplay between RL and game theory is used to create modeling frameworks
for two different engineering realms, where multiple (180 in one case and 125 in the other)
human interactions are involved.
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Algorithm 2 Interplay between RL and Game Theory
1: Set i = 0
2: while i < k do
3: Load the level-i policy
4: Set cognition levels of all players in the environment other than the learning agent to
level-i, i.e. set policies of players to level-i policy
5: Place the learning agent in the initialized environment, in which all players are level-i
6: Start the training of the learning agent using a reinforcement learning method, through
which agent learns how to best respond to level-i players
7: Once the training is completed, learning agent becomes a level-(i+1) player
8: Save the policy of the learning agent as level-(i+1) policy
9: i += 1
10: end while
Remark 2. The methods discussed in this paper, which are used to model cyber-physical
human systems, are used solely for modeling purposes. Therefore, they are not meant to be
used in physical motion systems.
Remark 3. There exist several successful cyber-physical system models in the literature.
The bottleneck in driving models for cyber-physical human systems, is computing the multi-
agent, multi-move decision making dynamics, which corresponds to obtaining the models in
the green “Humans” block in Figure 3. Therefore, in this paper, to emphasize the power of
the discussed game theoretical modeling approach in predicting human responses, we avoided
employing complicated vehicle models.
Remark 4. The cyber-physical human systems modeling method explained in this paper
merges reinforcement learning and game theory. It is noted that the level-k approach is not
the only game theoretical method that can be employed here. Theoretically, other game theo-
retical methods can also be used. However, as explained in this section, thanks to the hierar-
chical modeling approach inherent in the level-k reasoning, modeling multi-move, multi-agent
scenarios with simultaneous decision makers can be handled in a computationally tractable
manner, which makes the level-k method a suitable candidate for the scenarios investigated
in this paper.
5. Hybrid airspace modeling
With hybrid airspace we refer to an airspace where manned and unmanned aircraft coex-
ist. As discussed at length in Section 2.1, obtaining hybrid airspace models is a necessity for
successful integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the National Airspace Sys-
tem (NAS). In this section, we present how the game theoretic modeling framework discussed
here is used to realize the modeling of these systems.
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Figure 5: A hybrid airspace scenario where red squares represent manned aircraft and the cyan square is
used to indicate an unmanned aircraft (UA). The yellow circles in the 600 km x 300 km airspace are the
waypoints assigned to the UA. (Musavi et al. (2016), reprinted with permission of the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc.)
Figure 5 shows a hybrid airspace scenario where a UAS (cyan) is assigned to follow certain
waypoints (yellow) in a crowded airspace filled with manned aircraft (red). We are interested
in how the overall system will evolve in time.
To be able to predict the possible outcomes of this scenario, we need to create a model
that will capture the reaction dynamics of manned aircraft pilots in cases of separation
conflicts. As discussed earlier, the game theoretical modeling approach produces policies,
which are probabilistic maps from observations to actions, to represent human reactions.
Therefore, to obtain these policies, we first need to clearly define the observation and action
spaces and represent them in a way that is meaningful for the RL algorithm. Once these
spaces are explicitly defined, pilot goals and preferences need to be expressed in form of a
reward function. Furthermore, to train pilot policies in a simulation environment, we need
to realize the motions of the aircraft, manned and unmanned, using their physical models.
Finally, sense and avoid algorithms need to be integrated to UAS dynamics for collision
avoidance. Below, we explain how these pieces are obtained and then assembled to create
the overall hybrid airspace model. Furthermore, we discuss the validation studies conducted
using data.
5.1. Observation and action spaces
Self-separation concept, where the pilots (and crew) are responsible for keeping a safe
distance from encountered traffic, is a procedure that is being explored for Next Generation
(NextGen) Air Transportation System (Wing et al., 2013). One of the technologies that can
make this possible is Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADSB), which provides
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state information of the surrounding traffic, with a precision better than the radar (Kacem
et al., 2018). In the above scenario, we assume that aircraft are equipped with this technology.
To factor in cognitive limitations, the observation space is set as a pie shaped region formed
by two circles sharing a common center, which is depicted in Figure 6, on the left. The
inner circle radius is taken as 1 nmi and the outer circle radius is taken as 5 nmi, reflecting
the standard separation requirements for manned aircraft (Perez-Batlle et al., 2012). These
circles are then divided into 3 slices resulting in 6 different observation regions. If an intruder
approaches one of these regions, the region that is being approached is coded with number
1, 2, 3 or 4, depending on the approach angle, while the rest obtains a zero value. For
example, in Figure 6, Aircraft B is approaching Aircraft A’s observation space with a 120
degree angle which makes the corresponding entry for the approached region take the value
of 2, while the rest are assigned 0. This is shown under the state components section on
the rightmost side of the figure. The information of the best immediate actions that will
make the aircraft approach its predetermined trajectory (Best Trajectory Action, BTA) and
to its predetermined destination (Best Destination Action, BDA), together with the pilot’s
Previous Action (PA) are also coded into the state components. The pilot action space
consists of 3 actions: 45 degrees left, straight and 45 degrees right, and these actions are
coded as 0, 1 and 2, respectively, in the state components. It is noted that these actions go
through aircraft dynamics to produce the actual aircraft motion. During training, the state
components entries are continuously updated, based on the explanations given above, and
used in the RL algorithm. With the aforementioned observation and action spaces, the RL
algorithm need to assign Q values to 56 × 33 × 3 = 1, 265, 625 state-action pairs.
Remark 5. The actions described in this section are not the actions of the aircraft but
the decision inputs to the real continuous aircraft dynamics, whose outputs are the aircraft
actions. The aircraft dynamics is explained in Section 5.3.
5.2. Reward function
For the RL algorithm to evaluate the desirability of selecting a certain action given a
state, a reward function that specifies pilot preferences and goals is required. For the UAS
integration into NAS scenario, the reward function
r = −ω1C − ω2S − ω3I + ω4D + ω5P − ω6E (9)
is used, where C and S represent the number of aircraft (manned or unmanned) occupying
a space within the collision and separation regions of the ego aircraft, respectively. The
definition of these regions can be found at Planning et al. (2007) and Perez-Batlle et al.
(2012). I is binary and gets the values of 1 or 0 depending on whether the ego aircraft
is approaching or distancing from the intruder. D and P are the degrees of approach (or
distancing) by the ego aircraft to its destination and to its defined trajectory, respectively,
normalized by the distance covered in one time step. To accommodate the tendency of
humans to minimize energy consumption as much as possible, E is introduced to represent
effort, taking the values of 1 or 0, depending on whether the pilot takes a new action or not,
respectively.
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Figure 6: Observation space. (Musavi et al. (2016), reprinted with permission of the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc.)
Remark 6. The selection of the reward function plays a crucial role in the performance of
the reinforcement learning algorithm. A formal procedure for the determination of a proper
reward function is an open area of research. However, addressing context-dependent problems
that reflect the agent's preferences, while keeping the function simple is the general approach
for determining the reward functions. One problem that needs to be solved in this section
is avoiding collisions and separation violations, which is addressed by the terms C, S and
I in (9). Another problem is reaching a given destination while following a predetermined
trajectory, which is addressed by the terms D and P . Finally, the problem of energy con-
servation is addressed by the term E. An alternative to (9) could be a reward function that
uses continuous variables for all the terms. This would increase the resolution but could
unnecessarily complicate the function. In certain problems such as learning a policy from
an expert, the reward function selection can be done using a more systematic approach by
solving an inverse reinforcement learning problem (Sutton and Barto, 2018).
5.3. Physical models of manned and unmanned aircraft
As explained above, aircraft are controlled by pilots’ commands of heading angle changes
(±45 degrees). Using the standard turn rate of 3 deg/s angular velocity (Nancy, 2016), we
model the aircraft turning motion with a first order dynamics having a time constant of 10
seconds. The related differential equation is
Ψ˙ = −0.1(Ψ−Ψd), (10)
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where Ψ and Ψd represent the current and the desired heading angles, respectively. The
manned aircraft are assumed to be flying in en route phase with a constant velocity v,
having the x and y coordinate components
vx = |v| sin Ψ (11)
and
vy = |v| cos Ψ. (12)
Unmanned aircraft are assumed to fly autonomously while avoiding collisions using an on-
board sense and avoid (SAA) algorithm. This algorithm commands velocity vector changes
if an intruder is detected. Using a 1 second time constant (Mujumdar and Padhi, 2011) and
a first order dynamics, the velocity vector dynamics are modeled as
~˙v = −(~v − ~vd), (13)
where ~vd is the desired velocity vector. Two SAA algorithms are employed in the simula-
tion environment with different velocity vectoring properties. Both of them first detects a
probable conflict by forecasting the future trajectories of both the ego and intruder aircraft,
and checking whether the minimum calculated distance, R, between them is smaller than a
predetermined threshold value. If a conflict is detected, a desired velocity vector command,
~vd, is produced. One of the SAA algorithms (SAA1) proposed by Fasano et al. (2008) issues
the velocity command
~vd =
(
~vei cos(η − ξ)
sin(ξ)
(
sin(η)
~vei
|~vei| − sin(η − ξ)
~r
|~r|
)
+ ~vi
)
, (14)
in cases of conflict, where the ego unmanned aircraft velocity command and intruder aircraft
velocity are represented by ~vd and ~vi, respectively. Similarly, ~r and ~vei refer, respectively,
to the relative position and velocity between these two aircraft, and η is the angle between
these two vectors. Angle ξ is determined as ξ = sin−1(R/|~r|). The other SAA algorithm
(SAA2) used in simulations provides the velocity command
~vd =
−~ve(~r0·~vei|~vei| )− (R− |~rm|) ~rm|~rm|∣∣∣∣− ~ve(~r0·~vei|~vei| )− (R− |~rm|) ~rm|~rm|
∣∣∣∣ (15)
to resolve conflicts, where ~r0 and ~rm stand for the initial and minimum relative positions
between the ego unmanned aircraft and the intruder (Mujumdar and Padhi, 2011).
5.4. Simulation results
After the necessary pieces explained above are set to create the overall hybrid airspace
model, pilot reactions are obtained using the interplay, explained in Section 4, between the
level-k game theoretical approach (Section 3.1) and Jaakkola reinforcement learning method
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Algorithm 3 Interplay between RL and Game Theory in NAS
1: i = 0
2: while i < k (k is the maximum cognition level) do
3: Load the level-i policy
4: Set the policies of all the pilots in the scenario, other than the ego pilot (the pilot
being trained), to level-i
5: Start the training of the ego pilot using reinforcement learning, through which the
pilot learns how to best respond to level-i pilots
6: Once the training is completed, the ego pilot becomes a level-(i+ 1) pilot
7: Save the policy of the ego pilot as level-(i+ 1) policy
8: i+ = 1
9: end while
(Section 3.2.3). The algorithm that details this process is given in Algorithm 3. Once the
pilot reaction dynamics are created, quantitative analyses on the integration scenario are
conducted using Monte Carlo simulations. Since one of the bottlenecks of UAS integration
into NAS is the maturation of SAA algorithms, we present how the modeling method dis-
cussed in this article can be used to conduct comparative quantitative analysis on various
aspects of different SAA methods. Specifically, we analyze the effect of distance horizon and
time horizon variables used in the SAA development. In this article, we define the former
as the scan radius of the algorithm, and the latter as the amount of projection time used to
detect a conflict.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 depict the effect of varying distance and time horizons on tra-
jectory deviations, flight times and number of separation violations, for SAA1 and SAA2,
respectively. A few conclusions, not in increasing or decreasing importance, can be drawn
from these results. First, although time horizon makes a significant effect on both safety
(separation violations) and performance (trajectory deviations and flight times) measures
for SAA1, the unmanned aircraft equipped with SAA2 is not affected as much with the vari-
ation of this parameter. Second, the effect of the distance horizon on separation violation
numbers levels out quickly for SAA1, while SAA2 keeps showing lesser and lesser violation
rates, although SAA1 provides a safer traffic in the same parameter range. Third, UAS
trajectory deviations are generally smaller when SAA2 is employed. Fourth, an interesting
but expected phenomenon is observed: the trajectory deviations of manned and unmanned
aircraft have negative correlation. As the UAS trajectory deviations increase, showing that
SAA is doing more work for keeping a safe distance, manned aircraft pilots spend less effort
and have less trajectory deviations. All these results obtained in a simulation environment
with real-time decision making pilots can be used in testing and tuning of SAA algorithms,
as well as making a quantitative comparison between different approaches.
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(a) manned aircraft trajectory deviation
(b) UAS trajectory deviation
(c) UAS flight time
(d) number of separation violations
Figure 7: When SAA1 is employed in HAS, effects of varying time and distance horizons on separation viola-
tions, flight times and trajectory deviations are presented. (Musavi et al. (2016), reprinted with permission
of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc.)
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.(a) manned aircraft trajectory deviation
(b) UAS trajectory deviation
(c) UAS flight time
(d) number of separation violations
Figure 8: Safety vs. performance in HAS, when SAA2 is employed is depicted by showing the changes in
trajectory deviations, flight times and separation violations with the changes in distance and time horizons.
(Musavi et al. (2016), reprinted with permission of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
Inc.)
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5.5. Validation
Although we do not have enough, if at all, UAS integration data to test against the
predictions of the game theoretical modeling approach, the resulting models created by the
method need to be validated using other means, to achieve at least a minimum level of
credibility. Several validation methods are introduced in the literature, such as face validity,
comparison with validated models, historical data validation, parameter sensitivity analysis
and predictive validation (MITRE Corp., 2014). Among these, the ones that are based
on data are the most effective validation methods. It is noted that when the data becomes
available, one needs to test if relevant statistics between the data and the model are matching.
For example, average aircraft trajectory deviation and the average number of separation
violations can be compared. Furthermore, during individual encounters, pilot decisions and
minimum distances between UAS and manned aircraft, predicted by the model and obtained
from the data can be investigated to see whether or not they show similar characteristics. It
is noted that the game theoretical modeling approach has enough degrees of freedom, such
as reward function terms and weights, to be able to be modified, in case some discrepancies
between data and the model are observed when the data becomes available in the future.
This is an important feature that needs to be found in predictive models (Law, 2008). Since
currently data is not available, we discuss two methods that can be used without data: face
validation and comparison with a validated model.
Face validation evaluates two aspects of the model: the logic behind the modeling
method, and input-output relationships of the model. Two main approaches used in the
proposed model, namely reinforcement learning and game theory, are well-established fields
that showed promise in modeling real-life behavior. Experimental backing of the level-k game
theory is also provided in relevant references discussed in the review of existing work sections
in this article. Also, the logic behind the selection of reward function terms is explained in
earlier sections. We also discussed above the input-output relationships when we explained
the effects of different parameters on the airspace scenario with figures, and showed that the
results are reasonable.
Sample trajectories of a data-validated model developed by the Lincoln Laboratory
(Kochenderfer et al., 2008) is available online in two text files that are open to public:
cor ac1.txt and cor ac2.txt. A comparison of one of the available trajectories (encounter
3) with the game theoretical model prediction is provided in Figure 9. In the figure, start-
ing points of aircraft are indicated by thick dots. It is seen that pilot decisions, as well
as minimum distance between aircraft during the encounter are similar. Further trajectory
comparisons between the game theoretical model and this data-validated model can be found
in Musavi et al. (2016).
6. Road traffic modeling
Similar to the unmanned airspace system (UAS) integration study, to obtain the model
of the road traffic, we need the physical models of the cars, driver observation and action
spaces, and a reward function reflecting the goals and preferences of the drivers. Below, we
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(a) Trajectories created by the validated
model.
(b) Trajectories created by the proposed
model.
(c) Separation distances for each model.
Figure 9: Comparison of the trajectories created by the validated model and the game theoretical modeling
approach for sample encounter number 3. (Musavi et al. (2016), reprinted with permission of the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc.)
explain these components and also provide validation of the resultant overall model with
traffic data.
6.1. Driver observation and action spaces
Several different traffic scenarios can be modeled via the proposed approach. To be able
to test the results with data, we developed the model of a 5-lane highway, similar to the
US101 Hollywood Freeway, whose raw data is available at Colyar and Halkias (2007). In this
scenario, the human drivers are assumed to be observing (or being able to process from all
available data), his or her immediate neighboring lane cars (front left, front right, rear left,
rear right) and the car in front. Figure 10 presents a snapshot of a typical ego vehicle (red)
motion, where the driver can observe the surrounding 5 cars. As in the UAS integration
scenario, the observation space is quantized and the distances are coded as nominal, close
and far. It is noted that this quantization introduces noise and uncertainty to driver obser-
vations since instead of the exact location of neighboring cars, only a certain region occupied
by the car is known. The importance of introducing noise and uncertainty to the human
observations are discussed in Section 4 and represented by Observation blocks in Figure 3.
To determine reasonable values for quantization, the distance distribution between cars are
processed from the raw data provided in Colyar and Halkias (2007) and plotted in Figure 11.
Based on this distribution, nominal range is defined to be between 11 m - 27 m, close is
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Figure 10: Ego vehicle and surrounding traffic
Figure 11: Distribution of distances to car in front.
defined as smaller than 11 m and far is used for distances larger than 27 m. It is noted that
nominal region consists of approximately half of the area under the curve depicted in the
figure. Once the positions of the surrounding cars are defined, their relative motions against
the ego car are expressed as stable, approaching and distancing. As a result, the observation
space of the ego car consists of quantized positions and relative motions of the surrounding
cars.
As we use traffic data to obtain a meaningful observation space, part of the action space
is also formed by considering the acceleration distribution, the plot of which is given in
Figure 12, obtained by processing the same traffic data. According to this acceleration
distribution, acceleration inputs of the drivers are categorized into 5 separate continuous
sub-distributions: 1) Maintain, a normal distribution with zero mean and 0.075 standard
deviation, 2) accelerate a uniform distribution between 0.5 m/s2 - 2.5 m/s2, 3) decelerate
a uniform distribution between -0.5 m/s2 and -2.5 m/s2, 4) hard accelerate, a half normal
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Figure 12: Acceleration distribution
distribution with a 3.5 m/s2 mean and 0.3 m/s2 standard deviation, 5) hard decelerate, a half
normal distribution with -3.5 m/s2 mean and 0.3 m/s2 standard deviation. Drivers sample
these distributions to create an acceleration action, if they choose to. Two other action
choices for the drivers are move to the left lane and move to the right lane, during both of
which the velocity is assumed to remain constant.
6.2. Reward function
The driver reward function used in the reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm is
r = ω1C + ω2S + ω3D + ω4E, (16)
where C is binary, taking values of -1 and 0, depending on whether a collision occurred
or not; S is the normalized deviation of the ego vehicle speed from the mean speed of the
traffic; D is related to the distance between the ego vehicle and the car in front, and takes the
values of -1, 0 or 1 depending on whether the distance is close, nominal or far, respectively.
This term reflects the driver preference of having as much headway as possible. E is the
effort variable taking the value of 0 if the action is maintain; a value of -0.25, if the action
is accelerate or decelerate; and -0.5 if it’s hard accelerate or hard decelerate. E receives -1 if
the driver changes lane.
Remark 7. The terms of the reward function provided in (16) are determined based on the
specific problems that need to be solved to obtain driver dynamics. The solution of these
problems reflects the driver's preferences. Specific issues to be solved can be listed as col-
lision avoidance (term C), performance (term S), safety (term D) and comfort or energy
conservation (term E). Instead of discrete valued terms used in (16), continuously vary-
ing terms could be employed. However, while this would reflect the driver preferences in
a finer manner, it could introduce unnecessary complexity. A more systematic selection of
the reward function can be conducted for problems such as imitation learning, where inverse
reinforcement learning methods are applied (Sutton and Barto, 2018).
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6.3. Physical models
For the modeled traffic scenario, simple kinematic models are used to obtain vehicle
motion. Once the driver command is received, velocity and position dynamics are obtained
as
x(t+ ∆t) = x(t) + vx(t) ∗∆t+ 1
2
a(t)∆t2
y(t+ ∆t) = y(t) + vy(t) ∗∆t
vx(t+ ∆t) = vx(t) + a(t) ∗∆t, (17)
where vx and vy are the velocity components in the x and y directions, x and y coordinates
are the same as given in Figure 10, and ∆t is the simulation time step. It is noted that the
dynamics are not discrete but continuous, and have to be approximated due to computer
implementation.
6.4. Training, average rewards and entropy
Driver policies with various levels are trained using the Jaakkola reinforcement learning
algorithm explained in Section 3.2.3. During training, up to 125 vehicles are used in the
5-lane traffic scenario. Figures 13-15 show the time evolution of average rewards during
the training of level-1, level-2 and level-3 policies, together with the average entropy of the
probability distribution over actions. The entropy of a probability distribution is calculated
as
E = −
n∑
i=1
pi log(pi), (18)
where n is the number of probability values pi. Since the drivers have 7 actions, we have
n = 7. The entropy is highest when the distribution is uniform, which is the case in the
beginning of training, and drops as the training progresses and the distribution gets away
from uniform. However, as seen from the figures, although the average reward converges
relatively fast, entropy continues to drop at a very slow rate. The reason for this is that
there are several states with lower probability of being visited during training and after a
certain driving pattern emerges, the effect of these rarely visited states becomes very small.
This can also be observed from Figure 16, where the entropies of the two frequently visited
states are shown to converge to very small values.
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(a) Average reward per episode in level-
1 training
(b) Entropy per episode in level-1 train-
ing
Figure 13: Level-1 training
(a) Average reward per episode in level-
2 training
(b) Entropy per episode in level-2 train-
ing
Figure 14: Level-2 training
(a) Average reward per episode in level-
3 training
(b) Entropy per episode in level-3 train-
ing
Figure 15: Level-3 training
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(a) Entropy per visit of a state (b) Entropy per visit of a different state
Figure 16: Entropy per visit plots of two randomly selected states.
6.5. Data validation
The driver policies obtained using the game theoretical framework are compared with real
traffic data provided by Colyar and Halkias (2007). The data provides acceleration values
of the drivers at each measurement instant. This data is first processed to obtain the states
the drivers are in and then to find the frequency of taken actions at each state. These state-
action frequency distributions form the real driver policies. To compare the distributions
modeled using the proposed game theoretical approach and the distributions obtained from
data, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test for Discontinuous Distributions (Conover,
1972). In this test, if the unknown discrete probability distribution function is F (x) and the
hypothesized distribution is H(x), the null hypothesis H0 is defined as
H0 : F (x) = H(x) for all x. (19)
Three test statistics used in the test are
D = supx|Hc(x)− Sn(x)|, (20)
D− = supx(Hc(x)− Sn(x)) (21)
and
D+ = supx(Sn(x)−Hc(x)), (22)
where Sn(x) and Hc(x) are the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the observed data
and of the hypothesized distribution (model), respectively. The observed values of the test
statistics D, D− and D+ are defined as d, d− and d+, respectively. The goal of the KS test is
to calculate the probability of observing at least the value d for the test statistics D, which
can be stated as P (D ≥ d), given that the null hypothesis is true. This is achieved by first
calculating P (D+ ≥ d) and P (D− ≥ d), and then obtaining P (D ≥ d) as
P (D ≥ d) = P (D+ ≥ d+) + P (D− ≥ d−). (23)
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The details of obtaining P (D+ ≥ d) and P (D ≥ d−) are omitted here for brevity and can
be found in (Conover, 1972). Once P (D ≥ d) is calculated using (23), the null hypothesis
is rejected if P (D ≥ d) ≤ 0.05. Since this test provides meaningful results for distributions
with non-zero entries, action probabilities that are lower than 0.01 are set to 0.01 with
normalization, for both the real data and the driver model.
Data validation is conducted individually for each driver: For the driver of interest, first,
the action probability distributions for each visited state are computed. Second, these dis-
tributions are compared with derived driver policies using the proposed modeling framework
via KS test. Specifically, the distributions from the data are compared with level-1, level-2
and level-3 policies. Finally, the percentage of the states that can be successfully modeled
are reported. This procedure is repeated for every driver whose traffic data is available at
Colyar and Halkias (2007). The states that are visited less than a certain threshold number,
nlimit, during actual driving by the drivers and during training of the policies are not taken
into account. The results are reported for different values of nlimit. The algorithm used for
this validation procedure is provided in Algorithm 4, where nstate is the number of visited
states by the driver, nV driver is the number of times the driver of interest visited the state
being evaluated, nV model is the number of times the state is visited during the training of the
driver model, ncomp is the number of states that are used in the comparison and nsuccess is
the number of states for which the null hypothesis is not rejected.
Algorithm 4 Procedure of Comparison between one driver-one policy - Kolmogorov Smirnov
1: for i = 1 to nstate do
2: if nV driver ≥ nlimit and nV model ≥ nlimit then
3: ncomp+ = 1
4: Set pi to the probability mass function given by the driver model for the state being
evaluated.
5: Set ki to the probability mass function calculated from the driver data for the state
being evaluated.
6: Set Hc to the cumulative distribution function obtained from pi.
7: Set Sn to the cumulative distribution function obtained from ki.
8: Test the null hypothesis using KS test.
9: if Null hypothesis is not rejected then
10: nsuccess+ = 1
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: Set the percentage of the successfully modeled states to nsuccess/ncomp.
Data validations using Algorithm 4 are conducted for nlimit values of 0, 3 and 5, for each
individual driver and the results are reported below.
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6.5.1. Validation with nlimit = 1
Figure 17 shows the percentage of successfully modeled states for each driver, using
level-1, level-2 and level-3 policies as the driver models. Each vertical thin line represents an
individual driver and the x-axis shows the driver labels. It is seen that there are more than
two thousand drivers in the real traffic data. The y-axis shows the percentage of successfully
modeled states. The colors blue, red and yellow represent the successfully modeled states
by level-1, level-2 and level-3 policies, respectively. Figure 18 also shows the successfully
modeled states, but this time using a uniform distribution (UD) model for the drivers.
Finally, Figure 19 shows the difference between the level-k models (combined) and the UD
model, in terms of modeling percentages. It is seen that the level-k models cumulatively
perform better than the UD model. It is noted that although the level-k models perform
better, the percentage of states that are modeled using the UD model are high. The main
reason for this is the small nlimit, which is 1 in this case. For the state that is visited only
1 time by the actual driver, the KS test does not reject the hypothesis that the action
distribution over this state, obtained from the data, is sampled from a UD, since the sample
size is not large enough to arrive at a conclusion.
Figure 17: Percentages of successfully modeled states for each driver, using level-k models, when nlimit = 1.
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Figure 18: Percentages of successfully modeled states for each driver, using the uniform distribution model,
when nlimit = 1
Figure 19: Difference in successfully modeled state percentages, for each driver, using level-k (combined)
and UD models, when nlimit = 1.
Figure 20 shows the number of drivers, on the y-axis, and the percentage of the success-
fully modeled states by the level-k models (top) and the UD model (bottom). For example,
it shown that around 80% of the total visited states of 300 drivers are successfully modeled
by the level-k models, while only a handful of drivers’ states are successfully modeled up to
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60% by the same models. The more the distribution of bars on these figures are grouped on
the right, the better, since it shows that successfully modeled state percentages are higher.
Figure 20: Distribution of modeled percentages for combined policies and dumb policy, when nlimit = 3.
6.5.2. Validation with nlimit = 3
Figure 21 and 22 show the percentages of the successfully modeled states by the level-
k models and the UD model, respectively. As Figure 23 demonstrates, with an increased
threshold (nlimit = 3) the better performance of level-k models, compared to the UD model,
becomes more prominent . This is due to the increased power of the KS test with the
elimination of rarely visited states by the drivers.
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Figure 21: Percentages of successfully modeled states for each driver, using level-k models, when nlimit = 3.
Figure 22: Percentages of successfully modeled states for each driver, using the uniform distribution model,
when nlimit = 3.
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Figure 23: Difference in successfully modeled state percentages, for each driver, using level-k (combined)
and UD models, when nlimit = 3.
Figure 24 also demonstrates the increased performance difference between the level-k and
the UD models, in favor of the level-k, by showing the distribution of the number of drivers
over successfully modeled state percentages. As more of the rarely visited states are removed
from the comparison, the KS test is able to reject the null hypothesis more frequently for
the UD models.
Figure 24: Distribution of modeled percentages for combined policies and dumb policy, when nlimit = 3.
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6.5.3. Validation with nlimit = 5
When even more of the rarely visited states are removed from the test by increasing the
threshold further to nlimit = 5, the same trend in increased performance difference between
the level-k models and the UD model continues, as seen in Figures 25, 26, 27 and 28.
Figure 25: Percentages of successfully modeled states for each driver, using level-k models, when nlimit = 5.
Figure 26: Percentages of successfully modeled states for each driver, using the uniform distribution model,
when nlimit = 5.
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Figure 27: Difference in successfully modeled state percentages, for each driver, using level-k (combined)
and UD models, when nlimit = 5.
Figure 28: Distribution of modeled percentages for combined policies and dumb policy, when nlimit = 5.
To summarize, KS test results demonstrate that with varying levels of success, the ex-
ploited game theoretical modeling framework provides driver models whose predictive power
can be validated with real traffic data. Since it is hard to find similar driver models in
the literature, with probability distributions over actions, the results are compared with a
uniform distribution model. For all three nlimit values, level-k policies (combined) performed
better than the UD model.
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7. Computational Complexity
In both of the application areas, hybrid airspace modeling and road traffic modeling, dis-
cussed in the previous sections, the exploited game theoretic framework employed Jaakkola
reinforcement learning method explained in Section 3.2.3. In this section, a computational
cost analysis is provided for this method. Specifically, two questions are answered: 1) How
do the action and observation space sizes affect the computational complexity? 2) How do
the complexities of the physical motion models affect the computational complexity?
In the analysis, the dimensions of the state and action spaces are taken as S and A,
respectively. It is assumed that a) every state is visited K times during one sweep, and
b) the value functions are updated after each visit. For each state-action pair, (si, ai), the
functions given below are calculated:
βt(si, ai) =
(
1− χt(si, ai)
Kt(si, ai)
)
γtβt−1(si, ai) +
χt(si, ai)
Kt(si, ai)
βt(si) =
(
1− χt(si)
Kt(ai)
)
γtβt−1(si) +
χt(si)
Kt(si)
Qt(si, ai) =
(
1− χt(si, ai)
Kt(si, ai)
)
Qt−1(si, ai) + βt(si, ai)(Rt −R)
Vt(si) =
(
1− χt(si)
Kt(si)
)
Vt−1(si) + βt(si)(Rt −R)
for each action ak 6= ai
βt(si, ak) = γtβt−1(si, ak)
Qt(si, ak) = Qt−1(si, ak) + βt(si, ak)(Rt −R)
for each state sj 6= si and action al
βt(sj, al) = γtβt−1(sj, al)
βt(sj) = γtβt−1(sj)
Qt(sj, al) = Qt−1(sj, al) + βt(sj, al)(Rt −R)
Vt(sj) = Vt−1(sj) + βt(sj)(Rt −R)
for each state sx and action ay
pi(ay|sx) = (1− )pi(ay|sx) + pi1(ay|sx). (24)
Therefore, for each state visit, ((24 + (A−1)∗ (4)) + (S−1)∗ (A)∗ (8) +S ∗A∗4) operations
are required. Visiting all of the states, K times each, the total number of operations become,
K ∗ S ∗ ((24 + (A− 1) ∗ (4)) + (S − 1) ∗ (A) ∗ (8) + S ∗A ∗ 4), which can be expressed more
compactly as
R = caS
2A+ cbSA+ ccS, (25)
where R is the number of required operations, and ca, cb and cc are constants. Therefore,
the number of total operations can be given as O(|A||S|2).
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Using more complex vehicle dynamics, for example increasing the number of differential
equations of the vehicle dynamics by c, will result in a computational cost that is c times
of the initial cost. Since this a constant effect, the total number of operations can still be
expressed by O(|A||S|2).
8. Ongoing and Future work
In this section, we explain the current and future work about the game theoretical mod-
eling method explained in this paper. Part of these studies are already formulated but not
included in this article for a concise and clear exposition. Below, we briefly mention a few
that have the potential to improve the existing work in a meaningful manner.
8.1. 3D hybrid airspace
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) integration into National Airspace System (NAS)
studies presented in this article use a 2-dimensional (2D) geometry for aircraft motion.
Although it is demonstrated that the proposed framework can be used to provide significant
qualitative analysis power in UAS integration scenarios, the study is still limited and need
to be extended to 3D airspace. Preliminary studies are conducted in this direction, details
of which can be found in Musavi et al. (2018). One important distinction in this study is
the need for an approximate reinforcement learning algorithm to handle the dramatically
increased state space due to the 3D geometry.
In the 2D case, the observation space consists of 9 variables. 6 of these variables can take
5 different values, while the remaining 3 variables can take 3 different values. Therefore,
the size of the observation space is 56 × 33 = 421875. This means that 421875 rows are
required in the Q-table to represent each state. To store the values required during training,
16 columns are required. These columns are: state id, state value - V, state visit count,
state beta, action 1 probability, action 1 Q value, action 1 count, action 1 beta, action 2
probability, action 2 Q value, action 2 count, action 2 beta, action 3 probability, action 3 Q
value, action 3 count and action 3 beta. Hence, 421875 × 16 = 6750000 values are stored
in the Q-table as double. Since each double requires 8 bytes, 54 MB memory is required
to store the Q table. This is not a significant amount of memory, which can be handled
by any modern computer without any problem. However, when the geometry changes from
2D to 3D, the memory requirement becomes infeasible, even if we keep the action space the
same. Adding 6 more observation states with 5 possible values for each, the dimension of
the observation space becomes 512 × 33 = 6591796875, which translates into a requirement
of 800GB of memory to store the Q table. This calculation shows the necessity to use an
approximate reinforcement learning method that eliminates the need for storing a Q table.
The Neural Fitted Q-learning method, explained in Section 3.2.2 is currently being tested
for this task.
8.2. Large scale cyber-security scenarios
One ongoing study is creating a model of a large scale cyber-attack scenario, where
multiple attackers try to hack into a cyber-physical system and several defenders try to
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keep the system safe. Reliable predictions of attacker-defender dynamics is valuable since
they help design systems resilient to cyber-attacks. A two-person model of a cyber-attack
scenario of a smart grid system is already conducted by Backhaus et al. (2013). For a
larger scenario, similar to the 3D airspace case, problems of increased state space should be
solved together with integrating fast optimization algorithms to optimize the system design.
Furthermore, reward function design for multiple attackers and defenders is a challenge
especially if coordination within the attackers or defenders is envisioned.
8.3. Data validation
Although data validation studies are presented in earlier sections, they are still at their
initial stages due to several reasons. First, a lot more data is required for a reliable validation.
For example, in UAS integration studies, validation is conducted using a data-validated
model of manned aircraft encounters. We hope to obtain UAS and manned aircraft encounter
data in the near future as the technology advances. Furthermore, in the traffic scenario, we
used US101 data for validation but more road data is expected to be collected to ensure that
the proposed model has the capability to model a large variation of highway configurations.
In addition, as we use more data, we plan to fit the model parameters to certain amount of
data and then validate with independent traffic data. It is noted that parameter fitting to
data is not straightforward in the proposed method since reinforcement learning is involved
at various reasoning levels. Second, new statistical goodness of fit methods need to be
implemented to validate the model’s power of prediction. To the best of our knowledge,
no goodness of fit methods are implemented for either the UAS integration scenarios or
road traffic scenarios where multiple actions are involved. In our ongoing work we are using
Chi-square goodness of fit test and Kolmogorov goodness of fit test to validate the method.
9. Open problems and research opportunities
As mentioned in Section 8.1, one of the limitations of the level-k thinking solution concept
is that an agent’s assumption about other agents’ levels does not change during the game,
and one solution to this may be the dynamic level-k approach. However, this is only a
partial solution since the level types still remain unchanged. For example, if Agent A, after
watching Agent B for a few time steps, decides that his or her assumption that Agent B is
a level-0 player is wrong, then Agent A needs to update his or her assumption to another
level. However, the set of levels he or she can choose from are fixed: Agent A can modify his
assumption and assume that Agent B is a level-1 player (instead of level-0), therefore the
best response to this is producing the actions of a level-2 player. Agent-A can only change
his or her assumption to level-k, where k=1,2..., n, where all levels are already trained and
determined. A better, but more computationally expensive approach would be the following:
After watching Agent B for a few time steps, Agent A can update his or her assumption
by using, for example, a Bayesian update and come up a with a policy that is not in the
pre-trained set of levels. After this update, Agent A runs a reinforcement learning algorithm
online to determine the best response to Agent B’s newly updated policy. To achieve this,
we need to find new software and hardware solutions to handle the computational demand.
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Another open problem from a control engineering point of view is the problem of stability.
Stability in RL is already being studied by the control community as an open problem
(Bus¸oniu et al., 2018). When used in collaboration with game theory, specifically level-k
thinking, the problem becomes even harder to solve, and thus presents a rewarding research
direction.
10. Summary
In this article, we reviewed a modeling approach where reinforcement learning and game
theory work in tandem to predict cyber-physical human system (CPHS) behavior. Starting
from the basic building blocks, we explained the method in detail and then presented two
cases where models are created for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) integration into Na-
tional Airspace (NAS) and highway traffic scenarios. In both cases, validation studies were
discussed using different methods, including using real world data. Finally, we presented
ongoing and future works, together with related open problems, which can serve as fruitful
research directions.
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